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Que sera sera
Whatever will be will be
The future’s not ours to see
Que sera sera.
So sang Doris Day in 1956, expressing a near-universal belief of hu-
mankind. You can’t know the future. In this chapter I will trace the different
forms of this belief, both pre-scientific and scientific, and discuss some dif-
fering kinds of scientific justification for it in physics, culminating in the
form of the statement provided by the best physical theory we have found
to date, namely quantum mechanics. I will argue that quantum mechanics
casts doubt on the second line of the song, which suggests that even if we
can’t know it, there is a definite future (and also that we can’t do anything
to change it – something I will not discuss). This denial is also an ancient
belief: the future is open. If this line of the song expresses fatalism, the
denial of it might be related to the existence of free will, but, again, I will
not discuss this.
If it is not quite a universal belief of humankind that we can’t know the
future, the universal experience of humankind is that we don’t know the
future. We don’t know it, that is, in the immediate way that we know parts
of the present and the past. We see some things happening in the present, we
remember some things in the past, but we don’t see or remember the future.
But perception can be deceptive, and memory can be unreliable; this kind of
direct knowledge is not certain. And there are kinds of indirect knowledge of
the future which can be as certain as anything we know by direct perception
or memory. I reckon I know that the sun will rise tomorrow; if I throw a
stone hard at my kitchen window, I know that it will break the window. On
the other hand, I did not know on Christmas Eve last year that my home
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town of York was going to be be hit by heavy rain on Christmas Day and
nearly isolated by floods on Boxing Day.
In the ancient world, and, I think, to our childhood selves, it is events
like the York floods that make us believe that we cannot know the future. I
may know some things about the future, but I cannot know everything; I am
sure that some things will happen tomorrow that I have no inkling of, and
that I could not possibly have known about, today. In the past such events
might have been attributed to the unknowable will of the gods. York was
flooded because the rain god was in a bad mood, or felt like playing with us.
My insurance policy refers to such catastrophes as “acts of God”; when we
feel that there is no knowing who will win an election, we say that the result
is “in the lap of the gods”.
Aristotle formulated the openness of the future in the language of logic.
Living in Athens at a time when invasion from the sea was always a pos-
sibility, he considered the sentence “There will be a sea-battle tomorrow”.
One of the classical laws of logic is the “law of the excluded middle” which
states that every sentence is either true or false: either the sentence is true
or its negation is true. But Aristotle argued that neither “There will be a
sea-battle tomorrow” nor “There will not be a sea-battle tomorrow” is defi-
nitely true, for both possibilities lead to fatalism; if the first statement was
true, for example, there would be nothing anybody could do to avert the
sea-battle. Therefore these statements belong to a third logical category,
neither true nor false. In modern times this conclusion has been realised in
the development of many-valued logic [3].
But some statements in the future tense do seem to be true; I have given
the examples “The sun will rise tomorrow” and, after I have thrown the
stone, “That window is going to break”. Let’s look at these more closely. In
fact, none of these future statements are 100% certain. The sun might not
rise tomorrow; there might be a galactic star-trawler heading for the solar
system, ready to scoop up the sun tonight and make off with it at nearly
the speed of light. When I throw the stone at the window, my big brother,
who is a responsible member of the family and a superb cricketer, might be
coming round the corner of the house; he might see me throw the stone and
catch it so as to save the window.
We did not know that the sun would fail to make its scheduled appearance
tomorrow morning; I did not know that my naughtiness would be foiled. But
this lack of knowledge is not a specific consequence of the fact that we are
talking about the future. If the Spaceguard programme had had a wider remit
we might have seen the star-trawler coming, and then we would have known
that we had seen our last sunrise; if I had known my brother’s whereabouts
I could have predicted his window-saving catch. In both these scenarios
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the lack of knowldege of the future reduces to lack of knowledge about the
present.
The success of modern science gave rise to the idea that this is always true:
not knowing the future can always be traced back to not knowing something
about the present. As more and more phenomena came to be explained
in terms of the laws of physics, so that more and more events could be
explained as being caused by previous events, so confidence grew that every
future event could be predicted with certainty, given enough knowledge of
the present. The msot famous statement of this confidence was made by
Laplace in 1814:
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect
of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a
certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion,
and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this
intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it
would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest
bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an
intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the
past would be present before its eyes. ([4] p.4)
This idea goes back to Newton, who had a dream:
I wish we could derive the rest of the phenomena of Nature by
the same kind of reasoning from mechanical principles, for I am
induced by many reasons to suspect that they may all depend
upon certain forces by which the particles of bodies, by some
causes hitherto unknown, are either mutually impelled towards
one another, and cohere in regular figures, or are repelled and
recede from one another. [7]
In this view, everything in the world is made up of point particles, and their
behaviour is explained by the action of forces which make the particles move
according to Newton’s equations of motion. These completely determine the
future motion of the particles if their positions and velocities are given at
any one instant; the theory is deterministic. So if we fail to know the future,
that is purely because we do not know enough about the present.
For a couple of centuries Newton’s dream seemed to be coming true.
More and more of the physical world came under the domain of physics, as
matter was analysed into molecules and atoms, and the behaviour of mat-
ter, whether chemical, biological, geological or astronomical, was explained
in terms of Newtonian forces. The particles of matter that Newton dreamed
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of had to be supplemented by electromagnetic fields to give the full pic-
ture of what the world was made of, but the basic idea remained that they
all followed deterministic laws. Capricious events like storms and floods, for-
merly seen as unpredictable and attributed to the whims of the gods, became
susceptible to weather forecasts; and if some such events, like earthquakes,
remain unpredictable, we feel sure that advancing knowledge will make them
also subject to being forecast.
This scientific programme has been so successful that we have forgotten
there was ever any other way to think about the future. One author writes
In ordinary life, and in science up until the advent of quantum
mechanics, all the uncertainty that we encounter is presumed to
be . . . uncertainty arising from ignorance. [1]
We have completely forgotten what an uncertain world was inhabited by the
human race before the seventeenth century, and we take Newton’s dream as
a natural view of waking reality.
Well, it was a nice dream. But it didn’t work out that way. In the
early years of the twentieth century Ernest Rutherford, investigating the re-
cently disocvered phenomenon of radioactivity, realised that it showed ran-
dom events happening at a fundamental level of matter, in the atom and
its nucleus. This did not necessarily mean that Newton’s dream had to be
abandoned — the nucleus is not the most fundamental level of matter, but
is a complicated object made up of protons and neutrons, and maybe, if we
knew exactly how these particles were situated and how they were moving,
we would be able to predict when the radioactive decay of the nucleus would
happen. But other, stranger, discoveries at around the same time led to the
radical departure from Newtonian physics represented by quantum mechan-
ics, which strongly reinforced the view that events at the smallest scale are
indeed random, and there is no possibility of precisely knowing the future.
The discoveries that had to be confronted by the new physics of the 1920s
were twofold. On the one hand, Planck’s explanation of the distribution of
wavelengths in the radiation emitted by hot matter, and Einstein’s explana-
tion of the photoelectric effect, showed that energy comes in discrete packets,
instead of varying continuously as it must do in Newton’s mechanics and
Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory. On the other hand, experiments on elec-
trons by Thomson, Davisson and Germer showed that electrons, which had
been firmly established to be particles, also sometimes behaved like waves.
These puzzling facts found a systematic, coherent, unified mathematical de-
scription in the theory of quantum mechanics which emerged from the work
of theorists after 1926. This theory was itself so puzzling that it is not clear
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that it should be described as an “explanation” of the puzzling facts it in-
corporated; but an essential feature of it, which seems inescapable, is that
when applied to give predictions of physical effects, it yielded probabilities
rather than precise numbers.
This is still not universally accepted. Some people believe that there are
finer details to be discovered in the make-up of matter, which, if we knew
them, would once again make it possible to predict their future behaviour
precisely. This is indeed logically possible, but there would necessarily be
aspects of such a theory which lead most physicists to think it highly unlikely.
The format of quantum mechanics is quite different from previous physical
theories like Newtonian mechanics or electromagnetism (or both combined).
These theories work with a mathematical description of the state of the
world, or any part of the world; they have an equation of motion which
takes such a mathematical description and tell you what it will change into
after a given time. Quantum mechanics also works with a mathematical
object which describes a state of the world; it is called a state vector (though
it is not a vector in three dimensions like velocity), and is often denoted
by the Greek letter ψ or some similar symbol. But this is a different kind
of mathematical description from that in mechanics or electormagnetism,
which consists of a set of numbers which measure physical quantities like
the velocity of a specified particle, or the electric field at a specified point
of space; the quantum state vector is a more abstract object whose relation
to physical quantities is indirect. From the state vector you can obtain the
values of physical quantities, but only some physical quantities — you can
choose which quantities you would like to know, but you are not allowed to
choose all of them. Moreover, once you have chosen which ones you would like
to know, the state vector will not give you a definite answer; it will only give
you probabilities for the different possible answers. This is where quantum
mechanics departs from determinism. Strangely enough, in its treatment of
change quantum mechanics looks like the old deterministic theories. Like
them, it has an equation of motion which will tell you what a given state
of the world will become after a given time; but because you can only get
probabilities from this state vector, it cannot tell you what you will see after
this time.
State vectors, in general, are puzzling things, and it is not at all clear
how they describe physical objects. Some of them, however, do correspond
to descriptions that we can understand. Among the state vectors of a cat,
for example, is one describing a cat sitting and contentedly purring; there
is another one descibing it lying dead, having been poisoned in a diabolical
contraption devised by the physicist Erwin Schro¨dinger. But there are others,
obtained mathematically by “superposing” these two state vectors; such a
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superposed state vector could be made up of a part describing the cat as
live and a part describing it as dead. These are not two cats; the point of
Schro¨dinger’s story was that one and the same cat seems to be described
as both alive and dead, and we do not understand how such states could
describe anything that could arise in the real world. How can we believe
this theory, generations of physicists have asked, when we never see such
alive-and-dead cats?
There is an answer to this puzzle. If I were to open the box in which
Schro¨dinger has prepared this poor cat, then the ordinary laws of everyday
physics would ensure that if the cat was alive, I would have the image of a
living cat on my retina and in my visual cortex, and the system consisting
of me and the cat would end up in a state in which the cat is alive and I see
a living cat. If the cat was dead, I would have the image of a dead cat, and
the system consisting of me and the cat would end up in a state in which
the cat is dead and I see a dead cat. It now follows, according to the laws
of quantum mechanics, that if the cat is in a superposition of being alive
and being dead, then the system consisting of me and the cat ends up in a
superposition of the two final states described above. In symbols,
|
 
−〉me
(
|alive〉cat + |dead〉cat
)
−→ |
 
⌣〉me|alive〉cat + |
 
⌢〉me|dead〉cat. (1)
Here a symbol like |Ψ〉cat denotes a state vector of the cat, with ψ varying
to describe different states (e.g. Ψ =“alive”), and similarly |Φ〉me denotes a
state vector of my body and brain, while |Ψ〉cat|Φ〉me denotes a state vector of
the joint system of the cat and me. The plus sign between two state vectors
denotes the operation of superposition (mathematically, it is very similar to
the process of adding two vectors in space to give a third vector in between
the first two).
Look hard at the equation (1). Nowhere in it is there a state of my brain
seeing a peculiar alive-and-dead state of a cat; there are only the familiar
states of seeing a live cat and seeing a dead cat. This is the answer to the
question at the end of the paragraph before the last one; it follows from
quantum mechanics itself that although cats have states in which they seem
to be both alive and dead, we will never see a cat in such a state.
But now the combined system of me and the cat is in one of the strange
superposition states introduced by quantum mechanics. It is called an en-
tangled state of me and the cat. How are we to understand it? We can
understand the states represented by |
 
⌣〉me|alive〉cat and |
 
⌢〉me|dead〉cat
individually — the cat is alive in one of them, and dead in the other, and I
have the corresponding visual experience — but what does this mathematical
sum, this superposition, mean? Maybe the mathematical sign + just means
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“or”; that would make sense. But unfortunately this meaning, if applied to
the states of an electon, is not compatible with the facts of interference ob-
served in the experiments that show the electron behaving like a wave ([9] p.
22–24, 207). Some people think that this + should be understood as “and”:
when the cat and I are in the state (1), there is a world in which the cat has
died and I see a dead cat, and another world in which the cat is still alive and
I see a living cat. Others do not find this a helpful picture ([8], [9] p. 221).
Let us just take it as a true description of the cat and me, whose meaning is
problematic.
Now let us broaden our horizon and consider the whole universe, which
contains each one of us considered as a sentient, observing physical system.
According to quantum mechanics this has a description by a state vector like
(1), with me replaced by any sentient obsever and the cat replaced by the
rest of the universe. A sentient system, like you or me, has a large number of
possible experiences, each of which occurs physically in certain states of the
sentient system. These are described by state vectors of the understandable
kind like |
 
⌣〉me and |
 
⌢〉me. The whole universe can then be described by
a state vector generalising (1), in which the states of the cat are replaced by
states of the rest of the universe which go with the possible experiences of
the observer. For those who like equations, the state vector of the universe
is of the form
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
n
|η
n
〉|Φ
n
(t)〉 (2)
where |Ψ(t)〉 is the state vector of the whole universe at time t, |η
n
〉 is a
state vector of the observer in which they are having the experience η
n
, and
|Φ
n
(t)〉 is the corresponding state of the rest of the universe.)
Saying that this is the truth about the universe seems to conflict with my
knowledge of what I see. Let us suppose that the cat survived when I did
Schrodinger’s experiment. Then I know that my state is |
 
⌣〉me and therefore
the cat’s state is |alive〉cat. The other part of (1) is not part of the truth;
it describes something that might have happened but didn’t. In the general
case of the whole universe, I know that I have just one of the experiences η
n
and therefore that the state of me and the rest of the universe is just one of
the terms |η
n
〉|Φ
n
(t)〉 and not the whole of (2). But this contradicts what
was asserted in the previous paragraph. Which of these is the truth?
This contradiction is of the same type as many familiar contradictions
between objective and subjective statements. It can be resolved in the way
put forward by Thomas Nagel [5, 6]: we must recognise that there are two
positions from which we can make statements of fact or value, and state-
ments made in these two contexts are not commensurable. In the external
7
context (the God’s-eye view, or the “view from nowhere”) we step outside our
own particular situation and talk about the whole universe. In the internal
context (the view from now here), we make statements as physical objects
inside the universe. Thus in the external view, the state vector |Ψ(t)〉 is the
whole truth about the universe; the components describing my different pos-
sible experiences, and the corresponding states of the rest of the universe, are
(unequal) parts of this truth. But in the internal view, from the perspective
of some particular experience |η
n
〉 which I know I am having, that experience,
together with the corresponding state of the rest of the universe, is the actual
truth. I may know what the other components are, because I can calculate
|Ψ(t)〉 from the Schro¨dinger equation; but these other components, for me,
represent things that might have happened but didn’t.
We can now look at what quantum mechanics tells us about the future.
As we should now expect, there are two answers, one for each of the two
perspectives. From the external perspective, the universe at any one time is
described by a universal state vector, and state vectors at different times are
related by the Schro¨dinger equation. Given the state vector at the present
time, the Schro¨dinger equation delivers a unique state vector at any future
time: the theory is completely deterministic, in complete accord with Pascal’s
world-view (in a quantum version).
From the internal perspective, however, things are completely different.
We now have to specify a particular observer (who has been me in the above
discussion, but it could have been you or anyone else, or indeed the whole hu-
man race taken together), with respect to which we can carve up the universal
state vector as in (2); and we have to specify a particular experience state
of that observer, say |η0〉. From the perspective of that experience, it is by
definition true that the observer has the definite experience η0, and it follows
from (2) that the universe is in a product state |η0〉|Φ0(t)〉. The Schro¨dinger
equation applies, as before. But with this initial state the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion will yield a state of the universe at a future time which, in general, is
not a product state; in particular, in situations like that of Schro¨dinger’s
cat in which quantum effects are amplified to a macroscopic level at which
they can be seen by our observer, the initial product state will develop into
a superposition like the right-hand side of (1). So at the future time there
will be a universal state vector of the form (2), in which most terms will be
zero but more than one experience state of the observer occurs with non-zero
coefficient. (A “coefficient” here is a state vector of the rest of the universe,
the magnitude being significant.) What is the present observer to make of
this? The experience states in the non-zero components must describe pos-
sible experiences of the observer at the future time t. No one of them is
singled out as being what the observer actually will experience at that time.
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Some of them, though, loom larger than others, accordng to the magnitudes
of their coefficients in the universal state vector.
I found this rather startling when I first encountered it. I was used to
thinking that there is something awaiting me in the future, even if I cannot
know what it is, and even if there is no law of nature which determines what
it is. Whatever will be will be, indeed. But Aristotle already saw that this
is wrong. A statement about the future, in general, cannot be actually true,
even when we are careful to distinguish being true from our knowing that it
is true. But we can say more than that.
Aristotle pointed out that although no one statement about the future
is actually true, some of them are more likely than others. Similarly, the
universal state vector at the time t contains more information, for me, than
my possible experiences at time t. These experience states, occurring as
components of the universal state vector, contribute to it to different ex-
tents, measured by the magnitudes of their coefficients. Such magnitudes
are usually used in quantum mechanics to calculate probabilities. So we can
understand the future universal state as giving information, not only about
what experiences are possible for me at that future time, but also about how
probable each experience is.
The nature of proabability is a long-standing philosophical problem [2],
to which scientists also need an answer. Many scientists take the view that
the probability of an event only makes sense when there are many repetitions
of the circumstatnces in which the event might occur, and we count up the
number of times that it does occur; they hold that the probability of a single,
unrepeated event does not make sense. But what we have just outlined does
seem to be a calculation of a single event at a time which will only come
once. In everyday life we often talk about the probability that something
will happen on just one occasion — that it will rain tomorrow, or that a
particular horse will win a race, or that there will be a sea-battle. A standard
view of such single-event probability is that it refers to the strength of the
belief of the person who is asserting the probability, and can be measured by
the betting odds they are prepared to offer on the event happening. But the
probability described in the previous paragraph is an objective fact about the
universe. It has nothing to do with the beliefs of an individual, not even the
individual whose experiences are in question; that individual is being told
a fact about their future experiences, whether they believe it or not. What
does this probability mean?
The probability that I will have a particular experience tomorrow — that
I will see the cat alive, for example — arose in the context that there is no
fact about what experience I will have tomorrow; the statement “I will see a
living cat” is neither true nor false. In logical terms, its truth value is neither
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1 nor 0. But if the probability of this experience is close to 1, the statement
is nearly true; if it close to 0, the statement is nearly false. This suggests that
the truth value of the statement should be identified with its probability, and
that this tells us what the probability of a single event means. The probability
of a future event is the truth value of the future-tense proposition that that
event will happen. This view of probability, and the associated many-valued
logic of tensed propositions, has been explored in [10].
It has now become clear that the universal state vector plays very differ-
ent roles in the two perspectives, external and internal. From the external
perspective, it is a full description of reality; it tells how the universe is con-
stituted at a particular time. This complete reality can be analysed with
respect to any sentient system as in (2), yielding a number of components,
attached to different experiences of the chosen sentient system, which are all
parts of the universal reality. From the internal perspective of this system,
however, reality consists of just one of these experiences; the component at-
tached to this experience is the complete truth about the universe for the
sentient system. All the other non-zero components are things that might
have happened, but didn’t. The role of the universal state vector at a later
time, in this perspective, is not to describe how the universe will be at that
time, but to specify how the present state of the universe might change be-
tween now and then. It gives a list of possibilities at that later time, with a
probability for each of them that it will become the truth.
Human knowledge of the future, therefore, is limited in a fundamental
way. It is not that there are true facts but the knowledge of them is not
accessible to us; there are no facts out there, and there is simply no certain
knowledge to be had. Nevertheless, there are facts with partial degrees of
truth, and our knowledge of them is itself partial. Our best knowledge of the
future can only be probable.
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